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Articles 
REFORMING THE CRIMINAL LAW: UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF 
LAW GROUP GOES TO ANNAPOLIS 
By Lynn McLain l 
I. The Law is Ever Evolving 
Law students arrive at the beginning of their first year, 
expecting to "learn the law." They may naively think of 
the law as a body of information they must commit to 
memory. 
Law students quickly learn, however, that "studying 
law" is a more apt phrase for what will be a lifelong un-
dertaking. The law can never be "learned" in the sense of 
being memorized. Bits and pieces - some of its basic 
building blocks - can and should be committed to mem-
ory. But most important of these are the skills of (1) find-
ing the law applicable to a given problem (which in turn 
necessitates both analysis that results in asking the right 
questions and then searching all the appropriate places 
for the possible arswe-.;:) (2) analyzing that law, and analo-
gizing and synthesizing it to and with related legal author-
ity, and (3) finally, expressing one's reasoning and conclu-
sions clearly, both orally and in writing. 
Memorizing all of "the law" is impossible for two 
reasons. First, there is just too much law out there for any 
one person to memorize. This remains true even if one 
concentrates on a limited field, such as criminal law, family 
law, environmental law, trusts and estates, real property 
law, copyright law, patent law, bankruptcy law, trademark 
law, or tax law. Secondly, the law is ever evolving. Fed-
eral, state, and local agencies make new rulings and adopt 
new regulations; federal and state legislatures and town 
councils adopt new statutes and ordinances; executives 
issue executive orders; and courts all across the country 
(leaving aside, for a moment, intemationallaw) issue new 
opinions daily. 
Law school is merely a three-to-fouryear concen-
trated introduction to the study oflaw, which will become 
a lifetime avocation for all lawyers. Like most things in 
life, there are plusses and minuses to this fact. On the plus 
side, because the law is never finished, it need not remain 
the same. We can make an effort to reform it when we 
discern a need for improvement. 
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II. Law Students Can Achieve Law Reform 
The recognition that we may change the law for the 
better presents both a daunting and empowering challenge. 
University of Baltimore School of Law faculty, alumni, and 
students routinely take up this challenge on local, state, 
national, and international fronts. 
Recognition of my students' power to reform the law 
was brought home to several of my Evidence students in 
late fall 2001. In the midst of a section of the course 
focusing on character evidence in general, we whitewater 
rafted at a dizzying speed through the federal rape shield 
law, Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 412, and its Mary-
land state counterpart.2 I mentioned a recent decision of 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that, in my 
mind, pointed out the need to amend the Maryland stat-
ute, and asked that interested students contact me after 
the end of the semester if they wanted to pursue the chal-
lenge. 
This article will first provide some background re-
garding rape shield laws in general and the Maryland stat-
ute. It then will chronicle my students' and my successful 
efforts over the 2002 and 2003 legislative sessions to re-
form Maryland criminal and evidence law by legislatively 
overruling two Maryland appellate cases: Churchfield v. 
State,3 which held that the state rape shield law did not 
protect victims when the defendant was being tried for 
sexual child abuse, and Cooksey v. State,4 which held 
that Maryland recognizes no crime of continuing sexual 
offense against a child other than the rather narrowly ap-
plicable crime of child abuse.5 
III. The Rape Shield Laws in General 
Both the Maryland rape shield statute and FRE 412 
were adopted in the 1970s (19766 and 1978,1 respec-
tively) in a national wave oflaw reform achieved by "the 
women's movement." Studies show that rape was8 (and, 
unfortunately, remains)9 a vastly under-reported and, thus, 
under prosecuted crime. 
The 1970s reform was aimed at protecting rape vic-
tims from intimidation caused by having to face public hu-
miliation and harassment during cross-examination as to 
any consensual sex the victims might have had at anytime 
in their lives, with anyone other than the defendant. 10 These 
excoriating cross-examinations became known as "the 
second rape upon the witness stand. "11 Prior to the adop-
tion of the rape shield laws, many victims who reported 
rape declined to go forward with the prosecution of their 
assailants because the victims feared the ordeal of such 
brutal cross-examinations. 
The common-law theory of relevance - which, to 
many modem ears, no doubt seems so outdated as to be 
quaint - of this line of questioning was twofold. First, in 
every case in which a woman complained of a sexual as-
sault, her reputation as a previously unchaste woman was 
admissible to impeach her credibility by showing that she 
possessed a character that made her unworthy ofb~lief. ~2 
Secondly, if consent were raised as a defense, thIS eVI-
dence was admissible as substantive evidence to help 
prove consent. 13 The underlying logic was that if the vic-
tim consented to sexual activity with one person (e.g., her 
boyfriend or her fiance) it increased the likelihood that sh.e 
consented to sex with the defendant (no matter whether It 
was acquaintance "date rape" or dragged-by-a-stranger-
into-an-alley-rape). The fact that the victim was a "fallen 
woman" who had had premarital or extramarital sex was 
provable both by character witnesses who gave repu~a­
tion or opinion evidence as to the victim's lack of chastIty 
and, in some jurisdictions, by questioning the victim about 
specific instances of her prior sexual conduct. 14 
The legislators' response to the women's movement's 
outrage to this line of questioning was to pass "rape shield 
laws." Under these statutes and rules, evidence of the 
victim's reputation for chastity or lack of chastity is gener-
ally wholly inadmissible (unless the prosecution or victim 
puts it in controversy),15 as is another witness's opinion 
testimony regarding the victim's character for chastity. 16 
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual 
conduct is sharply curtailed. 
Rape shield laws generally provide that a victim's 
sexual activity with someone other than the defendant is 
inadmissible to prove consent to sex with the defendant. 17 
The only evidence of prior sex that is admissible on the 
issue of consent is evidence of prior instances of consen-
sual sex between the victim and the defendant. 18 
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sent, evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual 
conduct, other than with the defendant, may be admis-
sible under the rape shield laws, but only if shown in a 
pretrial hearing to have special relevance to the pending 
case. 19 For example, the rape shield laws do not per se 
preclude the defendant from offering evidence of the 
victim's sex with another person if it resulted in physical 
evidence that has been entered against the defendant or 
was found at the time ofthe charged crime, such as se-
men, or evidence of physical injury.20 To a large extent, 
however, the tremendous advance of DNA technology 
makes much of this kind of use of evidence of other sex 
obsolete.21 
FRE 412 contains an intentionally vague safety valve 
permitting the admission of evidence of the victim's sex 
. with others when its admission is mandated by "the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant" (i. e., the accused's right 
to confrontation).22 The Maryland statute guarantees that 
same protection but uses more helpful language. The 
Maryland statute provides that evidence that gives the vic-
tim a motive to falsely accuse the defendant will be admit-
ted. 23 
The Maryland statute provides: 
Evidence of a specific instance of a victim's prior 
sexual conduct may be admitted ... only if the 
judge finds that (1) the evidence is relevant; 
(2) the evidence is material to a fact in issue in the 
case; (3) the inflammatory or prejudicial nature of 
the evidence does not outweigh its probative value; 
and (4) the evidence is: 
(i) of the victim's past sexual conduct with 
the defendant; 
ii) isofaspecificinstanceofsexualactivity 
showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy, disease, or trauma; 
(iii) supports a claim thatthe victim has an 
ulterior motive in accusing the defendant 
of the crime; or 
(iv) is offered for the purpose of 
impeachment afterthe prosecutor has put 
the victim's prior sexual conduct inissue.24 
Both federal and state laws require that the defen-
dant provide pretrial notice of his or her intent to offer 
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evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activi-
ties.25 The trial judge, in an in camera (closed) hearing, 
must evaluate the probative value of such evidence against 
the risk of unfair prejudice to the victim, confusion and 
misleading of the jmy, and undue consmnption of trial time.26 
The judge generally must rule pretrial whether the 
evidence will be permitted.27 The requirement of a pre-
trial ruling prevents sneak: attacks on a victim. If the judge 
rules pretrial that the evidence will not be permitted, de-
fense counsel cannot delve into it at trial. If the judge rules 
that the evidence will be permitted, the victim may re-
evaluate whether she wishes to proceed. The victim also 
can appeal that interlocutory ruling, because forcing the 
victim to wait until after the objectionable evidence comes 
out at trial would provide the victim with no meaningful 
protection if the trial judge was incorrect. If the appellate 
court finds the trial judge erred, the victim will be pro-
tected at trial. 
IV, The Evolution of Maryland's Rape Shield 
Statute Pre-Churchfield 
As passed in 1976, Maryland's rape shield statute 
provided that it would apply in cases offirst- or second-
degree rape. Rape is defined under Maryland criminal 
law as involving penetration of the vagina.28 The initial 
rape shield law, therefore, responded to the need to pro-
tect female rape victims from being dragged through the 
mud by irrelevant cross-examination. The Legislature was 
responding logically to the identified problem: defendants 
were unfairly intimidating rape victims by (1) routinelyof-
fering reputation or opinion evidence as to the victims' 
lack of prior chastity and by (2) raising consent as a de-
fense and then harassing and humiliating victims by ques-
tioning them about their other unrelated sexual experiences, 
which were not in fact probative of consent with the de-
fendant. 
But the limited coverage of the rape shield statute 
necessitated its repeated amendment as it became clear 
this defense tactic could be used unfairly in the context of 
other charged sex crimes as to which consent was a de-
fense.29 In the flurry of piecemeal responses to that prob-
lem, the second implicit purpose of the initial law, reject-
ing the common-law precept that a female who had had 
sex other than in marriage was unworthy of belief, be-
came obfuscated. 
34.1 U. Bait L.E 4 
The bills that we proposed in 2002 and 2003, and 
the one that ultimately passed in 2003, addressed both of 
these problems, so as to put a stop to the use of such 
information to impeach a female's credibility and to pre-
clude the need for further piecemeal amendment. The 
bills also extended the scope of Maryland's "rape shield 
law" to provide equal protection for male and female vic-
tims of sex crimes. 
A. Credibility: The Second Tine ofthe 
Common-Law Fork 
Maryland's 1976 rape shield statute responded most 
obviously to the outrage voiced over the notion that a 
woman's consensual sex with one man prior to or outside 
marriage somehow helped to prove that she consented to 
sex with any other man. Yet it also implicitly responded to 
another, at least equally perfidious common-law doctrine: 
that such a "fallen woman" was unworthy of belief when 
she testified under oath. 
The common law permitted character evidence as 
to a woman's lack of chastity for these two purposes, 
consent and credibility, in two ways: 
(l) Testimony by character witnesses as to the 
woman's reputation in the community for lack of chas-
tity30 (later expanded by statute to permit opinion testi-
mony' as well),3J and 
(2) Proof of specific instances of the woman's sexual 
conduct other than that pertinent to the charged crime, by 
questioning the woman herself and, perhaps, by extrinsic 
evidence as well. 32 
The great evidence scholar Dean Wigmore happily 
embraced this unashamedly sexist doctrine. He wrote, in 
1940: 
There is ... at least one situation in which 
chastity may have a direct connection with 
veracity, viz. when a woman or young girl 
testifies as complainant against a man 
charged with a sexual crime, - rape, 
rape under age, seduction, assault. 
MocJem psychiatrists have amplystudied the 
behavior of errant young girls and women 
coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. 
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, 
distorted partly by inherent defects, partly 
by diseased derangements or abnormal 
instincts, partly by bad social environment, 
partly by temporary physiological or 
emotional conditions. One fonn taken by 
these complexes is that of contriving false 
charges of sexual offences by men. The 
unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds 
incidental but direct expression in the 
narrationofimaginmysex-incidentsofwhich 
the narrator is the heroine or the victim. 
* * * 
No judge should ever let a sex-offense 
charge go to the jury unless the female 
complainant's social history and mental 
makeup have been examined and 
testified to by a qualified physician.33 
Wigmore advocated that rules of evidence "must be 
modified or interpreted to pennit the woman's charac-
ter as to chastity to be considered, inasmuch as this trait 
may be inextricably connected with a tendency to 
unveracity in charges of sex o.ffences."34 
Maryland's General Assembly rejected this line of 
thinking in two ways in 1976, when it passed the State's 
first rape shield law. First, it excluded reputation and opin-
ion evidence as to a rape victim's chastity altogether. Sec-
ond, it restricted evidence of specific instances of the 
victim's other sexual experiences to those having specific 
relevance. One of these permissible categories listed in 
the statute goes directly to the victim's credibility: "Evi-
dence which supports a claim that the victim has an ulter-
ior motive in accusing the defendant of the crime .... "35 
TIlls provision was not intended to un-do the statute's 
trumping of the common law, which had permitted such 
evidence de rigeur in every case. Rather, it was intended 
(and subsequently construed) to permit such evidence only 
when it was highly relevant, in that it provided a specific 
motive to falsely charge rape. In 1976, the classic hypo-
thetical example of when this provision would apply was 
when an unmarried female had become pregnant as a re-
sult of consensual sex with her lover; wanting to cover up 
that fact, she falsely cried rape by another person, the 
defendant.36 Today, the child's patemitycould be readily 
determined. 
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B. Piecemeal Extension ofthe Crimes Covered 
In 1977, only one year after the initial passage of the 
rape shield statute, the General Assembly realized that the 
statute was under-inclusive, and amended it to apply also 
in prosecutions for commission of any "sexual offense in 
the first or second degree. "37 Sexual offense in either the 
first38 or the second39 degree includes engaging in any of 
various sexual acts with another, other than vaginal inter-
course: cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse.40 
The rationale for the rape shield law's application to rape 
applied equally when other sexual offenses were charged. 
The statute, however, remained under-inclusive. In 
1997, it was again amended to explicitly include prosecu-
tions for attempted rape in the first or second degree and 
attempted sexual offenses in the first or second degree.41 
The evidence of the victim's prior chastity or lack thereof 
was, of course, no more probative in such cases than it 
was in cases for the accomplished rape or sexual offense. 
Over the years, the courts faced the questions of 
how to treat the rape shield law if (1) a crime listed in the 
statute was being prosecuted along with lesser included 
crimes or (2) only a lesser included crime was being pros-
ecuted. 
V. Case Law Pre-Churchfield as to Lesser 
Included Offenses 
The Court of Special Appeals quickly discerned that 
the rape shield law would be entirely foiled if it were held 
to apply only to the prosecution of a crime listed in the 
staMe, and not to the prosecution oflesser included crimes 
also being prosecuted in the same trial. In a first -degree 
rape case, for example, lesser included crimes could in-
clude second-degree rape, sexual offense in the first, sec-
ond, third, or fourth degree, child sexual abuse, sexual 
abuse of a vulnerable adult, incest, sodomy, and simple 
assault, as well as attempts at a number of these crimes.42 
The Court of Appeals thus held, in Davenport v. State,43 
that the statute also applied to lesser included offenses in 
a trial for one or more of the offenses enumerated in the 
statute. 
Ten years later, on April 2, 200 1, in Churchfield v. 
State,44 the Court of Special Appeals declined to extend 
this holding to the situation when only a lesser included 
offense was charged. The Churchfield case had pro-
ceeded to trial only on the charge of sexual child abuse. 
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VI. Churchfield 
In Churchjield, the Court of Special Appeals not 
only held the rape shield statute inapplicable where the 
trial was for sexual child abuse, it returned to the anti-
quated Wigmore approach that the female victim's lack of 
chastity was probative of her lack of truthfulness. 
A. Background Facts 
Christina, the victim in Churchfield, was the daugh-
ter of the defendant and his second wife. Christina was 
ten years of age when she was removed from her drug-
addicted mother's home in Florida and sentto live with 
her father and his third wife in Wicomico County, Mary-
land.4s After some time, her adult half-brother (born to 
her father and his first wife) came to live there alsO.46 Her 
half-brother impregnated Christina when she was twelve.47 
Christina gave birth to a baby, who was given to another 
relative to raise in another state.48 
A couple of years later, Christina ran away from home 
to live with a boyfriend's family.49 At that time, she con-
fided to the boyfriend's mother that her father had been 
having sexual intercourse with her.so The boyfriend's 
mother reported the matter. 51 Social services investi-
gated, 52 and a Wicomico County Assistant State's Attor-
ney, Angela Di Pietro,53 prosecuted the father. 
B. The Charges: Cooksey's Effect 
Initially, Ms. Di Pietro charged Christina's father with 
second-degree rape, incest, and second-degree assault, 
as well as sexual child abuse, all continuing over a certain 
period of time. 54 Like most child victims, Christina ap-
parently did not remember the specific dates that each 
sexual act occurred. The Court of Appeals' June 2000 
decision in Cooksey v. State intervened 55 
In Cooksey, the child victim, and thus the State, was 
not able to state precisely when the sexual acts occurred. 56 
Cooksey was indicted and charged for committing, inter 
alia, second- and third-degree sexual offenses by, respec-
tively, performing cunnilingus on a child under the age of 
fourteen, when Cooksey was four or more years older 
than the child, and by engaging in various other specified 
sexual contacts with the child, continuously ''up to fifteen 
times" over the period of a year. 57 The Court of Appeals 
held that Maryland recognizes no crime of continuing sexual 
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offense other than sexual child abuse, so that Cooksey's 
indictment had to be dismissed. 58 Cooksey held that 
Maryland law required that such allegations be charged 
individually for each particular occurrence. 
The Court of Appeals held that, of sexual offense 
crimes, only the crime of sexual child abuse could be 
charged as a crime continuing over a period of time. 59 It 
let stand a count for sexual child abuse of the same child 
for that conduct "up to fifteen times" over a period of a 
year, as well as a count of sexual abuse against another 
child under the age of eighteen, between 75 and 100 times 
over a three-year period.60 
In light of the Cooksey decision, the Wicomico 
County State's Attorney's office nolle prossed the sec-
ond-degree rape, incest, and second-degree assault 
charges against Christina's father and went to trial only on 
the charge of sexual child abuse.61 
C. The Trial 
At the time of trial, Christina was fifteen years 01d.62 
She testified for the State and was extensively cross-ex-
amined by defense counse1.63 The defense was permitted 
to bring out the fact that Christina had a baby when she 
was twelve and to try to show that she was angry with her 
father for having made her give up the baby.64 The de-
fense also wanted to question Christina as to whether she 
was, at age fifteen, having sex with two teenaged boy-
mends.65 The trial judge, the Honorable Donald C. Davis, 
sustained the prosecution's objection.66 
Judge Davis ruled that the defense was free to ques-
tion Christina, and offer others' testimony, about alleged 
conflicts between father and daughter regarding curfew 
and other disciplinary matters.67 Indeed, the defense did 
so not only in its questioning of Christina, but also in pre-
senting testimony both by the defendant and by Christina's 
stepmother. The father testified that he had disciplinary 
problems with Christina including "clashes" over her manner 
of dress, wearing make-up, and dating.68 The father also 
admitted, that upon his arrest, he stated, "'I'll take care of 
that bitch when this is over. "'69 The stepmother testified 
that Christina was a liar and a manipulator.7o 
Such evidence supported the defense's theory that 
Christina fabricated the rape claim to "get back" at her 
father for having taken the baby away and for imposing 
disciplinary rules. 71 But Judge Davis ruled that the de-
fense could not go into whether she was having sex with 
boys her age.72 
In the opinion of the author, Judge Davis ruled cor-
rectlyunder Maryland Rules 5-40373 and5-611(a).74 The 
jury could well understand the defense's allegation that an 
out-of-control teenager resented her father's restrictive 
rules. The fact that Christina was allegedly having sex 
with teenaged boys added no substantial probative value 
to her alleged motive to falsely claim rape by her father; 
going into this matter would result in unfair embarrass-
ment of and prejudice to her, distraction of the jurors from 
the issues in the case, and undue consumption of court 
time. 
Moreover, there was no risk the jury would con-
clude that Christina's ability to describe the physical act of 
sexual intercourse necessarily meant that she had had in-
tercourse with her father. The jury had heard testimony 
that she had been impregnated, several years before, by 
her adult half-brother and had given birth to a child.75 In 
addition, the defendant had also managed to testify that 
Christina ''used to brag about having sexual intercourse," 
before the prosecutor's objection was sustained.76 
Having heard the sharply conflicting testimony, the 
jury apparently believed Christina and disbelieved her fa-
ther; the jury found the father guilty. He was sentenced to 
fifteen years imprisonment. 77 
D. Reversal and Remand 
On appeal, his conviction was reversed. In a deci-
sion shocking to this author, a unanimous panel of the Court 
of Special Appeals (Judge Raymond G. lbieme, Jr. (re-
tired), joined by Judge John J. Bishop (retired) and Judge 
Peter Kmuser) held that Judge Davis's ruling precluding 
inquiry into Christina's sexual activities with her alleged 
two boyfriends was an abuse of discretion, constituting 
reversible error.78 Moreover, although an appellate court's 
role is not to second-guess ajury's findings as to credibil-
ity,79 the panel appeared to do just that. Judge lbieme, 
writing for the court, appeared to fully credit the father's 
testimony; Judge lbieme asserted, "Christina accused her 
father of the very activity from which he sought to pro-
tect her .... "80 
The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case 
for a new trial. As Ms. Di Pietro prepared to go to trial 
again, the father pled guilty in exchange for a lesser sen-
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tence (4~ years imprisonment, 1112 years probation).81 
He will remain a registered sex offender. 82 
Christina, who was sent to live in a group foster home 
in Baltimore, is in the process of being adopted by an-
other family.83 
E. Churchjield's Holding as to the Rape Shield 
Law 
The Court of Special Appeals held in Churchfield 
that because trial proceeded only on sexual child abuse, a 
crime not listed in the rape shield statute, the rape shield 
law's protection was unavailable.84 The underlying act 
charged was the same vaginal intercourse as occurs in 
first-or second-degree rape.85 Thus, Christina, a minor 
victim, lacked the protection that an adult rape victim would 
have had under the rape shield law. As the students ar-
gued in their subsequent written testimony before the 
House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judicial Pro-
ceedings Committee, the Churchfield status quo resulted 
in Maryland's giving the least protection to those most 
vulnerable and most in need of the shelter offered by the 
rape shield statute. 86 
F. The Court of Special Appeals' Theory of 
Relevance 
The rape shield law did not exclude the evidence 
proffered by the defense in the Churchfieldtrial because 
the defendant was prosecuted only for sexual child abuse. 
But in order for exclusion of the evidence to be error, it 
had to have been otherwise admissible. In order to be 
admissible, it had to meet the threshold requirement for 
any evidence: relevance to an issue in the case.87 
Consent is not a defense to sexual child abuse. 88 
Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals' theory as to rel-
evance of the evidence excluded in Church field could 
not have been that it was probative that the girl consented 
to sex with her own father. Rather, the appellate court's 
opinion was that the evidence was relevant to Christina's 
credibility. In Wigmoresque tones, Judge Thieme wrote 
that the young victim's alleged sex with her teenaged boy-
friends was highly probative of her "credibility, especially 
about her sexual activities, and the extent to which she 
would go to evade parental restrictions in that area,"89 
and of her "propensity to lie about sex. ''90 This language 
rang false to many modern ears, including some at the 
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University of Baltimore School of Law. 
The Court of Special Appeals had in effect told 
Christina that, even though the jury had found she had 
been victimized, the jury had been duped. It seemed 
to this author that the appellate court's clear message 
to Christina was that she was not only unworthy of 
beliefif she was sexually active, she was also unwor-
thy of protection. 
Unfortunately, many fifteen-year-olds are sexu-
ally active today.91 The Church field approach would 
pennit impeachment of each of them in this manner if 
they alleged sexual abuse. 
Until Church field, this position would seem to 
have been universally discredited since the 1970s. 
As the reviser of Wigmore's treatise wrote in its 1983 
edition: 
§ 62. Character of complainant in rape 
and other sex crimes. 
Wigmore argued strongly for the 
admissibilityofcharacter forchastity and 
unchastity in the prosecutions for sex 
offenses against women, believing that 
such evidence should be admitted on 
the issue of the "credibility" of the 
complainant. Wigmore had a deep-
rooted fear of baseless criminal 
prosecutions instigated by women 
having a psychological disposition ''to 
imaginaIyand fulse charges" and plainly 
thoughtthattheadmissibilityofcharacter 
forunchastity was anecessazy safeguard 
against the possibility of such 
prosecutions. Wigmore's views were 
shared by the men ofhis generation and 
by the men of the following generation. 
But times have changed, and quite 
suddenly. In most states [including 
Maryland, under art. 27, § 461A], the 
assumption now prevails that character 
for unchastity is inadmissible, in the 
absence of special Circumstances.92 
What was particularly heartbreaking about 
Church field was that it is well documented that vic-
tims of sexual child abuse, such as Christina (who had 
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been abused by her half-brother), often become promis-
cuous as a result of their loss of self-esteem due to the 
abuse.93 To require trial judges to permit their cross-ex-
amination as to their subsequent consensual acts is to 
"blame the victim" and further destroy their hope of re-
gaining control of their lives. In a terrible irony, the 
Churchjield decision, making such children inherently 
impeachable, made them "safer" targets for subsequent 
adult sexual predators. 
VII. University of Baltimore Group's 
Response: Taking up the Cudgel 
It is no wonder that when I met Davis Ruark, the 
Wicomico County State's Attorney, at a Lower Eastern 
Shore Bar educational event in November 200 1, he asked, 
"What are we going to do about Churchfielcl?" Learning 
that no one had plans to craft a legislative response, this 
author (who was to be on sabbatical, writing, in spring 
2002 and thus was freed from a class schedule) deter-
mined to take up the cause and invited my fall semester 
Evidence students to help. Over the course of two years, 
seven students valiantly gave their time and energy to this 
law reform effort.94 
Experienced lobbyists know the ropes oflegislative 
procedures well. They also maintain a constant presence 
in the Legislature. Would-be reformers without those luxu-
ries rely on the good will of sympathetic legislators, pri-
vate citizens, and public interest groups. We were fortu-
nate to find many of each. Over the Christmas 2001 
break, students llana Cohen, Christian Elkington, Michele 
Payer, Carlotta Woodward, and John Maclean volun-
teered. They in turn solicited letters of support from other 
students, including Anna Mantegna, who also traveled to 
Annapolis to testify. 
As things developed, we proposed two bills in the 
January to April 2002 legislative session: one to overrule 
Churchfield by amending the rape shield statute, and one 
to overrule Cooksey by creating a crime in Maryland for 
a continuing sexual offense against a child. The Cooksey/ 
continuing offense bill passed in 2002, and was signed 
into law by Governor Parris N. Glendening. The 
Churchfieldlrape shield bill passed both houses, in slightly 
different forms, but was not taken up by a Conference 
Committee, so failed. We vowed to return the next year. 
In the 2003 session, Ilana Cohen, Anna Mantegna, 
and I returned, joined by first-year student Joyce 
Lombardi. The rape shield bill passed this time, and was 
signed into law by Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. The 
participating students put their skills in analysis, research, 
and persuasion to the test through lobbying and providing 
oral and written testimony, emerging victorious. They are 
well poised to continue their law reform efforts through-
out their legal careers. 
A. A Complicated Process: The 2002 Session 
Over the 2001 Christmas break, I drafted a pro-
posed amendment to the rape shield statute and worked 
on obtaining sponsors and co-sponsors interested in over-
turning Church field. I met with then Delegate Kenneth 
Montague, law partner of University of Baltimore alumna, 
and one of my former students, Gustie Taler. Delegate 
Montague served on the Judiciary Committee, to which 
the bill would be assigned, and as chair of its subcommit-
tee onjuvenile law. He offered to sponsor the bill. 
When I explained the history of the rape shield law 
as intended to protect women from the unequal treatment 
provided by the common law, he pulled out his copy of 
Black's Law Dictionary and discovered that "chaste" had 
a connotation referring only to females.95 We agreed that 
the bill should make the statute gender neutral. He pro-
posed to do this by adding, after the word "chastity," the 
gender-neutral phrase, "or prior sexual activity." 
In the course of our conversation, I mentioned that a 
Wicomico County Assistant State's Attorney, Liz Ireland, 
had identified Cooksey as a problem. Saying "in for a 
penny, in for a pound," Delegate Montague said he would 
sponsor a bill to correct that problem as well. 
1. The Cooksey Bill 
As Judge Wilner pointed out in Cooksey: 
All of the courts are sympathetic to the plight 
of both the young victims, often unable to 
state except in the most general tenns when 
the acts were committed, and of prosecutors, 
either hampered by the lack of specific 
information or, when it is reported that the 
conduct occurred dozens or hundreds of 
times over a significant period, faced with 
the practical problem of how to deal with 
Articles 
such a multitude of offenses. The courts are 
all also properly concerned with the rights 
of defendants, who go to trial with a 
presumption of innocence, and with the 
ramifications to them of duplicitous 
pleading.96 
Judge Wilner quoted the highest court of Rhode Is-
land as having acknowledged that: "'reconceptualization 
of child sexual assault as a continuing course of conduct 
crime would eliminate duplicity problems in charging these 
offenses, '" but concluded, along with Rhode Island's court, 
that the creation of such a crime was for the legislature, 
not the court.97 
The Court of Appeals in Cooksey thus invited the 
General Assembly to act to create a continuing sexual of-
fense statute, as had been done by the legislatures in New 
York and California, if it deemed it desirable: "New York 
and California attempted to deal with the problem by stat-
ute, allowing the legislative branch, after public hearings, 
to weigh all of the competing interests and concerns and 
strike a proper balance. That avenue, of course, is open 
in Maryland. "98 I learned that two bills (H.B. 939, spon-
sored by Del. Grosfeld, and H.B. 156, sponsored by Del. 
Kelly) had been submitted the previous year to overturn 
Cooksey, but they were not passed by the House Judi-
ciary Committee. We reviewed those bills, and Christian 
set about researching the other states' laws, referenced 
by Judge Wilner in Cooksey, that recognized crimes of 
continuing sexual offenses against children. Using those 
states' statutes, from New York99 and California, 100 as well 
asArizona's statute, and case law upholding their constitutional-
ity, we arrived at a draft that seemed to take the best from 
those models. 
We proposed recognition of a felony for commit-
ting, over a period of ninety days or more, three or more 
sexual acts against a child under the age offourteen and 
proposed that it be punishable by up to thirty years im-
prisonment.101 To support a conviction, a jury would need 
only to agree that the defendant committed three or more 
such acts; ifmore than three were charged, the jurors would 
not have to be unanimous as to which three the defendant 
committed. The draft was supported by a fact sheet sum-
marizing the applicable case law from other states, as well 
as Maryland's. llana, Christian, and I met in Annapolis 
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with Delegate Montague and his legislative aide, "Brother 
Frank," a kind and gifted fonner Catholic school principal 
who in mid-life switched gears to law school and a career 
in law. Delegate Montague submitted the draft to Legis-
lative Reference, which made some nonsubstantive 
changes. 
With our own phone calls and the leadership of Del-
egate Montague and Brother Frank, as well as the lobby-
ing support of Ellen Mugmon, we added co-sponsors: 
Delegates Sharon Grosfeld (Chair of the Judiciary 
Committee's subcommittee on criminal law), Ann Marie 
Doory (vice-chair of the Judiciary Committee), and Judi-
ciary Committee members William Cole and Michael 
Dobson to what had emerged from Legislative Reference 
as H.B. 1302. I submitted written testimony in support of 
the bill, using Christian's research (showing that similar 
statutes in other jurisdictions have been upheld as consti-
tutional),102 to support its constitutionality, and obtained 
promises from Assistant State's Attorneys John Cox of 
Baltimore County, Tonia Belton-Gofreed of Prince 
George's County, and Liz Ireland of Wicomico County to 
testify in person at the bill hearings. Other supporting wit-
nesses were Bobbi Seabolt of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and Ellen Mugmon of the State Council on Child 
Abuse and Neglect. Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, 
Jr., Coalition to Protect Maryland's Children, Citizens Re-
view Board for Children, Inc., and American Academy of 
Pediatrics submitted written testimony in support of the 
bill. 
At the committee hearings, Ted Wieseman of the 
Public Defender's Office and Lia Young testified against 
the bill, particularly the length of the maximum sentence. 
Yet, one argument that proved helpful for us as propo-
nents was that, in the absence of Maryland's recognition 
of such an offense, prosecutors had to charge mUltiple 
counts of rape or other sex crimes,103 and were some-
times obtaining sentences of over 100 years. Placing this 
crime on the books would give the prosecutors a more 
appropriate option (although they need not avail them-
selves of it). 104 
H.B. 1302 - the "Cooksey bill" - passed the House 
Committee, then the House; the Senate Committee, then 
the Senate; and was signed into law by Governor 
Glendening. It became effective on October 12,2002, 
and is codified as Section 3-315 of the Criminal Law Ar-
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2. The Churchfield Bill 
In the Senate, we obtained Senator Perry Sfikas' 
agreement to be the chief sponsor of the rape shield bill. 
Senator Philip Jimeno agreed to co-sponsor the bill. The 
Committee Chainnan, Senator Walter Baker, was also 
highly supportive. I previously had the pleasure of work-
ing with all three of them on other legislation. 
Our draft of the Churchfield bill was pre-filed and 
sent to Legislative Reference for numbering and for con-
formity in style with other bills. The rape shield bills be-
came Senate Bill 212 and House Bill 1067. The House 
Bill was sponsored by Delegate Montague and co-spon-
sored by Delegates Ann Marie Doory, Sharon Grosfeld, 
Bill Cole, Pauline Menes, Cannen Amedori, and Tim 
Hutchins. Legislative Reference rewrote the purpose 
clause, leaving our statements of intent on the cutting room 
floor. In light of the fact that the Criminal Law Article 27 of 
the Annotated Code was being recodified, Legislative 
Reference also confonned the bill to the new sections of 
the pending criminal law Article. 106 
As with the Cooksey bill, we prepared fact sheets, 
written testimony, and letters (submitted individually by 
Anna, Christian, Hana, John, and myself) in support of the 
Churchfieldbill. We made three main arguments: 
• In order to provide equal protection to 
all victims of sexual crimes, regardless of 
which particular sexual crime goes to trial, 
Art. 27, § 461A must be amended to extend 
to all victims of all sex crimes. In order 
to be sure that the rape shield law is not 
circwnvented, its protection also must extend 
to charges oflesser included crimes, such 
as simple assault. 
• Part of the cmrentlegislative initiative is to 
make clear that the General Assembly 
strongly and unequivocally rejects the 
Wigmore view that a female is unworthy of 
beliefbecause sheisnot a virgin or is sexually 
active. Moreover, it extends that same 
protection to male victims by adding the 
gender-neutral phrase "or prior sexual 
activity." 
• The bill thus corrects two significant, 
historical omissions by providing for equal 
protection for not only young victims and 
adult victims, but also equal protection for 
male victims andfemale victims. I07 
We found support for this initiative to be widespread. 
Written testimony was also provided byrnany other groups 
and individuals in 2002: 
State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Citizens' Review Board for Children 
The House of Ruth 
The Women's Law Center of Maryland 
Deputy State's Attorney for Prince George's 
County, Robert L. Dean 
Prevent Child Abuse Maryland 
ClinicallF orensic Social Worker in Office of 
State's Attorney for Baltimore City, ShannonB. 
Wood 
University of Baltimore School of Law Family Law 
Association President Dawn Anderson 
American Academy of Pediatrics 
Women Legislators of Maryland 
David Flemmer, Psy.D., Ph.D., child psychiatrist 
Robb Longman, Esq. 
University of Baltimore law studentsAdam MmKer 
and Rue Stewart 
Oral testimony was also provided in 2002 by: 
Baltimore County Assistant State's Attorney John 
Cox, Chief of Child Abuse and Sex Offense 
Division 
Wicomico County State's Attorney Davis Ruark 
and Assistant State's Attorney Angela Di Pietro 
Frederick County Deputy State's Attorney Charles 
Smith 
Ellen Mugmon, State Council on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 
Charlie Cooper, Citizens' Review Board for 
Children 
Bobbie Steyer, The House of Ruth 
Bobbi Seabolt, American Academy of Pediatrics 
Gloria Goldfaden, Prevent Child Abuse Maryland 
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Opponents were Angela Shelton, Larry Rogers, and 
Ted Wieseman of the Public Defender's Office. Before 
the House Judiciary Committee, Terry Rogers of the Public 
Defender's Office questioned the meaning of the gender-
neutral phrase "or other sexual activity." 
John Maclean, home in Illinois over Christmas break, 
had found that Illinois' rape shield statute applied to pro-
tect sexual child abuse victims. 108 Back in Baltimore, he 
wrote an op-ed piece for The Daily Record, supporting 
the bill. I09 Joe Surkiewicz wrote a news article about our 
efforts. I \0 
The bill passed the Senate as introduced. But, in 
response to the Public Defender's issue, the House Com-
mittee substituted the phrase "or abstinence" for the phrase 
"or prior sexual activity," though this change was not in-
tended to have any different substantive effect, and the bill 
passed the House with that amendment, on the last day of 
the session. The bill was not taken up in Conference. 
Because it did not pass both houses in identical form, the 
bill failed. llana, Anna, and I vowed to go back the next 
year and try again. On May 14, 2002, Christian, llana, 
and I appeared on WCBM's Court Talk, with Harold 
Dwin, to talk about the bill and our hopes for the next 
session. 
B. The 2003 Session 
With the leadership of Ellen Mugmon, a tireless child 
advocate and member of the State Council on Child Abuse 
and Neglect, we saw our Churchfield topic on the list to 
be considered in fall 2002 as part of the Women's Legis-
lative Agenda for 2003. Anna and I attended that group's 
meeting on October 6,2002. We met with several legis-
lators, including Delegate Liz Bobo and Senator Delores 
Kelley. I made an oral presentation. 
We were pleased to learn later that the bill was 
adopted as one of the group's top four legislative priori-
ties. We also netted the help of Maryland Citizens Against 
Sexual Assault, and its lawyer-lobbyist, Lisae Jordan, who 
volunteered to be the lead contact on the bill for the 
Women's Legislative Agenda 
The redistricting and the 2002 elections had lost us 
several of our sponsors and supporters, including Sena-
tors Sfikas and Baker and Delegates Montague and Cole. 
Delegate Grosfeld was elected to the Senate and Del-
egate Doory moved to another committee in the House. 
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Delegate Montague was appointed by Governor Ehrlich 
to be the Secretary of Juvenile Services. But again, we 
were fortunate. llana, first-year evening student Joyce 
Lombardi, and I met with Delegate Pauline Menes, who 
agreed to be our lead sponsor in the House, and with 
Senator Jennie Forehand, who agreed to be the lead spon-
sor in the Senate. Our sponsors submitted the bill as it 
had passed the House in 2002; it became numbered S.B. 
453 in the Senate and H.B. 196 in the House. 
S.B. 453 was sponsored by Senator Forehand and 
co-sponsored by Senators Jim Brochins, Ulysses Currie, 
Brian Frosh (new chair of the Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee), Rob Garagiola, Leo Green, Sharon Grosfeld, 
Paula Hollinger, Nancy Jacobs, Phil Jimeno, Delores 
Kelley, Gloria Lawlah, Thomas Middleton, and Leonard 
Teitelbaum. 
H.B. 196 was sponsored by Delegate Menes and 
co-sponsored by Delegates Joanne Benson, David 
Boschert, Bennett Bozman, Anthony Brown, Joan 
Cadden, Jon Cardin, Mary Conroy, Steven DeBoy, Sr., 
Ann Marie Doory, Don Dwyer, Adelaide Eckardt, Bar-
bara Frush, Tawanna Gaines, Marilyn Goldwater, Tim 
Hutchins, Mary-Dulany James, Sally Jameson, Darryl 
Kelley, Kevin Kelly, Nancy King, Ruth Kirk, Susan Lee, 
Mary Ann Love, Richard Madaleno, Jr., Salima Marriott, 
Brian Moe, Karen Montgomery, Dan Morhaim, Shirley 
Nathan-Pulliam, Doyle Niemann, Rosetta Parker, Obie 
Patterson, Carol Petzold, Neil Quinter, Justin Ross, Luiz 
Simmons, Ted Sophocleus, Veronica Turner, House Judi-
ciary Chairman Joe Vallario, and Bobby Zirkin. 
I met with Chairman Vallario and counsel to the 
House Judiciary Committee to discuss the bill. llana, 
Joyce, Anna, Lisae Jordan, and Ellen Mugmon met with 
numerous legislators and talked up the bill, as did Senator 
Forehand and her legislative aide, Maureen Reynolds, Del-
egate Menes and her aide, Grace Mary Brady. 
In response to the questions raised during the meet-
ings with individual legislators, llana set about delving into 
the legislative history of the original rape shield statute and 
each of its prior amendments. This endeavor entailed many 
hours spent poring over microfiche in the General 
Assembly's Annapolis library. Joyce used the Internet to 
research other states' rape shield laws. She discovered 
that Maryland's and Georgia's were the only two not to 
cover all sex offenses: Georgia's does not apply to sexual 
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ply to sexual child abuse. I I I 
Written testimony in support of the bills was submit-
ted not only by us, but also by: 
Maryland Family Violence Council, Attorney 
General J. Joseph Curran, Jr. 
House of Ruth, Dorothy Lennig 
Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence 
Maryland Commission on Women 
League of Women Voters 
Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault 
University of Baltimore Center for Families, 
Olllchm,am theCour1s 
Maryland State's Attorney's Association, by Sue 
Schenning, Deputy State 'sAttorney for Baltimore 
County 
State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Citizens' Review Board for Children 
Prevent Child Abuse Maryland 
Women's Law Center of Maryland 
Glenn Ivey, State's Attorney for Prince George's 
County 
American Association of University Women 
Maryland Jewish Alliance 
Family Law Association, student group, 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
Joseph Mantegna, retired police officer, Baltimore 
City 
Robb Longman, Esq. 
David Flemmer, Psy.D., Ph.D., child 
psychiatrist, Student Services, Montgomery 
County Public Schools 
University of Baltimore School of Law students 
Brendan 0' Connell, Thomas Merrill, Jennifer 
Merrill, Rue Stewart, Sheila Garrity, and 
Lawrence Katz 
Oral testimony other than ours and the sponsors' was 
provided by: 
Baltimore County Assistant State's Attorney Sue 
Hazlett, Child Abuse and Sex Offense Division, 
Chair of Maryland State's Attorneys' Association's 
Child Abuse Subcommittee 
Ellen Mugmon, State Council on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 
Lisae Jordan, MCASA 
Claude de Vastey, Women's Bar Association 
Cynthia Golomb, Maryland Network Against 
Domestic Violence 
I wrote an op-ed piece for The Daily Record 112 and 
Joyce contacted various news reporters and wrote letters 
to the editor of The Baltimore Sun. 
S.B. 453 passed both Committees and both Houses, 
was signed by Governor Ehrlich, and went into effect 
October 1, 2003. 113 The 2003 bill protects child abuse 
victims to the same extent as adult victims, and male vic-
tims as much as female victims. Opinion evidence or repu-
tation evidence as to a victim's sexual orientation will now 
be precluded. 114 But the statute does not preclude the 
prosecution from presenting evidence of the victim's prior 
specific acts or the absence thereof 115 
VITI. Conclusion 
The University of Baltimore law students who par-
ticipated in reforming Maryland's criminal law by the adop-
tion of the Cooksey bill, H.B. 1302, in 2002 and the rape 
shieldiChurchfieldbill, S.B. 453, in 2003 should be proud, 
as should all the dedicated public servants, including fonner 
Delegate Montague, Senator Forehand, and Delegate 
Menes, who led the fight for their passage. May the good 
works of all continue. 
Appendix A 
The "Cooksey Bill," H.B. 1302, enacted in 2002, 
and codified at Md. Crim. L. Code Ann. § 3-315 reads: 
§ 3-315. Continuing course of conduct with child. 
(a) Prohibited. - A person may not engage in a 
continuing course of conduct which includes three or more 
acts that would constitute violations of § 3-303, § 3-304, 
§ 3-305, § 3-306, or § 3-307 [rape in the first degree, 
rape in the second degree, sexual offense in the first de-
gree, sexual offense in the second degree, or sexual of-
fense in the third degree] of this subtitle over a period of 
90 days or more, with a victim who is under the age of14 
years at any time during the course of conduct. 
(b) Penalty. - (1) A person who violates this sec-
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tion is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to 
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. 
(2) A sentence imposed under this section may be 
separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a 
sentence under § 3-602 [sexual abuse ofaminor] of this 
title. 
(c) Determination. - In determining whether the 
required number of acts occurred in violation of this sec-
tion, the trier of fact: 
(1) must determine only that the required number of 
acts occurred; and 
(2) need not determine which acts constitute the re-
quired number of acts. 
(d) Merger. - (1) A person may not be charged with 
a violation of § 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-305, § 3-306, or § 
3-307 of this subtitle involving the same victim in the same 
proceeding as a violation of this section unless the other 
violation charged occurred outside the time period charged 
under this section. 
(2) A person may not be charged with a violation of 
§ 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-305, § 3-306, or § 3-307 of this 
subtitle involving the same victim unless the violation 
charged occurred outside the time period charged under 
this section. 
AppendixB 
The "Church field Bill," S.B. 453, enacted in2003, 
amended as shown, Md. Crim. L. CodeAnn. § 3-3 19, reads: 
Sexual Offenses - Reputation and Opinion 
Evidence and Evidence of Sexual Conduct-
Admissibility 
Article-Criminal Law § 3-319 
FOR the purpose of applying to sexual crimes against 
both males and females, the sexual abuse of a minor, the 
sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, and lesser included 
crimes a prohibition against admitting in a prosecution repu-
tation and opinion evidence relating to a victim's chastity 
or abstinence; applying to sexual crimes against both males 
and females, the sexual abuse of a minor, the sexual abuse 
of a vulnerable adult, and lesser included crimes and au-
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thorization for admitting in a prosecution under certain cir-
cwnstances a specific instance of a victim's sexual con-
duct; making a technical change; and generally relating to 
admissibility of reputation and opinion evidence and evi-
dence of sexual contact. 
(a) Evidence relating to a victim's reputation for chas-
tity OR ABSTINENCE and opinion evidence relating to 
a victim's chastity ORABSTINENCE may not be admit-
ted in a prosecution for rape, a seKl:IaI offeBse iB the first 
or sesoBe eegree, attemptee rape, or 8fI: attemptee se}{l:IaI 
offense in the first or sesoBe eegree:(1) A CRIME SPECI-
FIED UNDER THIS SUBTITLE 3 ORALESSERIN-
CLUDED CRIME; OR (2) THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF 
A MINOR UNDER § 3-602 OF THIS TITLE OR A 
LESSER INCLUDED CRIME; OR (3) THE SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE ADULT UNDER § 3-
604 OF THIS TITLE OR A LESSER INCLUDED 
CRIME. 
(b) Evidence of a specific instance of a victim's prior 
sexual conduct may be admitted in a prosecution tor rape, 
a seJuial offeBse iB the first or sesoBe eegree, attemptee 
rape, or an attempted SeJrnal offease iFl the fifst or sesooo 
degree described in subsection (a) of this section only if 
the judge finds that: (1) the evidence is relevant; (2) the 
evidence is material t..') a fact in issue in the case; (3) the 
inflammatory or prejudicial nature of the evidence does 
not outweigh its probative value; and (4) the evidence: 
(i) is of the victim's past sexual conduct with the de-
fendant; 
(ii) is of a specific instance of sexual activity showing 
the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or 
trauma; 
(iii) supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior 
motive to accuse the defendant ofthe crime; or 
(iv) is offered for impeachment after the prosecutor 
has put the victim's prior conduct in issue. 
(c) (1) Evidence described in subsection (a) or (b) 
of this section may not be referred to in a statement to a 
jury or introduced in a trial unless the court has first held a 
closed hearing 1:ll1der pamgraph (2) of this suesectioB and 
determined that the eVIdence is admissible. 
(2) The court may reconsider a ruling excluding the 
evidence and hold an additional closed hearing if new in-
formation is discovered during the course of the trial that 
may make the evidence admissible. 
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